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Abstract—Mobile-edge computing (MEC) is a promising tech-
nology to enable real-time information transmission and com-
puting by offloading computation tasks from wireless devices to
network edge. In this study, we propose a price-based distributed
method to manage the offloaded computation tasks from users.
A Stackelberg game is formulated to model the interaction
between the edge cloud and users, where the edge cloud sets
prices to maximize its revenue subject to its finite computation
capacity, and for given prices, each user locally makes offloading
decision to minimize its own cost which is defined as latency
plus payment. Depending on the edge cloud’s knowledge of the
network information, we develop the uniform and differentiated
pricing algorithms, which can both be implemented in distributed
manners. Simulation results validate the effectiveness of the
proposed schemes.
Index Terms—Mobile-edge computing (MEC), computa-
tion offloading, pricing, Stackelberg game.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing popularity of new mobile applications
of Internet of Things (IoT), future wireless networks with
billions of IoT devices are required to support ultra low-latency
communication and computing. However, the IoT devices are
usually with small physical sizes and limited batteries, thus
always suffer from intensive computation and high resource-
consumption for real-time information processing [1]–[3].
Mobile-edge computing (MEC) is a promising technology
to address this problem. Unlike conventional cloud computing
integrated with remote central clouds results in long latency
and fragile wireless connections, MEC migrates intensive
computation tasks from IoT devices to the physically proximal
network edge, and provides low-latency as well as flexible
computing and communication services for IoT devices. As
a result, MEC is commonly agreed as a key technology to
realize next-generation wireless networks [4].
Joint radio and computation resource allocation for MEC
has been recently investigated in the literature, e.g., [5]–
[12]. In general, the MEC paradigm can be divided into two
categories: binary offloading [5]–[9] and partial offloading
[10]–[12]. With binary offloading, the computation tasks at
users can not be partitioned but must be executed as a whole
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either at users or at edge cloud. With partial offloading, the
computation tasks at users can be partitioned into different
parts for local computing and offloading at the same time.
Among the mentioned literature, a handful of works [8],
[9] adopted game theory to design distributed mechanisms for
efficient resource allocation in MEC systems. For example,
multiuser binary offloading was considered in [8] using a Nash
game to maximize the offloaded tasks subject to the total time
and energy constraints. The work [9] considered competition
among multiple heterogeneous clouds. In view of prior works,
most of them assumed that the computation capacity of the
edge cloud is infinite. However, as MEC server is located
at network edge, its computation capacity should be finite,
especially in the networks with intensive workloads. In this
case, a mechanism is needed to control users’ offloaded tasks
to make the network feasible. Moreover, the mechanism should
provide reasonable incentives for both edge cloud and users to
efficiently allocate network resources in a distributed fashion.
Motivated by the above issues, we consider an edge cloud
with finite computation capacity, which is treated as a divisible
resource to be sold among the users. The interaction between
the edge cloud and users is modeled as a Stackelberg game,
where the edge cloud sets prices to maximize its revenue
and each user designs the offloading decision individually to
minimize its cost that is defined as latency plus payment. The
main contributions are two-fold: 1) We propose a new game-
based distributed MEC scheme, where the users compete for
the edge cloud’s finite computation resources via a pricing
approach, which is modeled as a Stackelberg game. 2) The
optimal uniform and differentiated pricing algorithms are pro-
posed, which can be implemented with a distributed manner.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
We consider a MEC system with K users and one base
station (BS) that is integrated with a MEC server to execute
the offloaded data of the users. All nodes have a single antenna.
The users’ computation data can be arbitrarily divided in bit-
wise for partial local computing and partial offloading. We
assume that the total bandwidth B is equally divided for
K users such that each user can occupy a non-overlapping
frequency to offload its data to the edge cloud simultaneously.
The quasi-static channel model is considered, where channels
remain unchanged during each offloading period, but can
vary in different offloading periods. We also assume that the
computation offloading can be completed in a period.
Let Ck denote the number of CPU cycles for computing
1-bit of input data at user k. It is assumed that user k has to
2execute Rk bits of input data in total, where 0 ≤ ℓk ≤ Rk
bits are offloaded to the edge cloud while the rest (Rk − ℓk)
bits are computed by its local CPU. The local CPU frequency
of user k is denoted as Fk that is measured by the number of
CPU cycles per second. Then the time for local computing at
user k is tloc,k = (Rk − ℓk)Ck/Fk. The offloading time toff,k
of user k comprises three parts: the uplink transmission time
tu,k, the execution time at the cloud tc,k, and the downlink
feedback time td,k. Thus, the offloading time toff,k is
toff,k = tu,k + tc,k + td,k. (1)
Since the local computing and offloading can be performed
concurrently, the required time of user k for executing the
total Rk bits data can be expressed as tk = max{tloc,k, toff,k}.
More specially, the data size of the computed result fed back
to user k is αkℓk, where αk (αk > 0) accounts for the ratio of
output to input bits offloaded to the cloud [13], which depends
on the applications of the users. Then we have tu,k = ℓk/rk
and td,k = αkℓk/rB,k, where rk =
B
K log2
(
1 + pkhkB/KN0
)
and
rB,k =
B
K log2
(
1 +
PB,khk
B/KN0
)
denote the uplink and downlink
transmission rates for user k, respectively. Here N0 is the noise
power spectrum density, hk is the channel gain between the
BS and user k, and PB,k and pk are the downlink and uplink
power for user k, respectively. Moreover, let fc,k denote the
computational speed of the edge cloud assigned to user k,
then we have tc,k = ℓkCk/fc,k. Here we consider equal fc,k
allocation for simplicity, i.e., fc,k = fC/K , where fC is the
total computational speed of the could.
We consider a practical constraint that the edge cloud
has finite computation capacity so that its CPU cycles for
computing the sum received data in each offloading period
are upper bounded by F , the constraint can be expressed as
K∑
k=1
ℓkCk ≤ F. (2)
Note that F and fC represent the MEC server’s computational
quantity and speed for the offloaded CPU cycles, respectively.
B. Stackelberg Game Formulation
In this paper, the users consume the edge cloud’s resources
to execute the computation tasks while the edge cloud has
to ensure its available CPU cycles for computing the total
offloaded data to be below the computation capacity. Hence, to
adjust the demand and supply of the computation resources, it
is considered that the edge cloud prices the CPU cycles ℓkCk
of the offloaded data for each user k. Thus the Stackelberg
game can be applied to model the interaction between the
edge cloud and users, where the edge cloud is the leader
and the users are the followers. The edge cloud (leader) first
imposes the prices for CPU cycles of users. Then, the users
(followers) divide their input data for local computing and
offloading individually based on the prices announced from
the edge cloud.
Denote the CPU cycle prices for users as a set µ =
{µ1, · · · , µK}. The objective of the edge cloud is to maxi-
mize its revenue obtained from selling the finite computation
resources to users. Mathematically, the optimization problem
at the edge cloud’s side can be expressed as (leader problem)
P1 : max
µ0
UB(µ) =
K∑
k=1
µkℓkCk s.t. (2).
Note that the offloaded data ℓk for user k is actually a function
of µk, since the size of data that each user is willing to offload
is dependent on its assigned price.
At the users’ side, each user’s cost is defined as its latency
plus the payment charged by the edge cloud, i.e.,
Uk(ℓk, µk) = tk + µkℓkCk, (3)
which is equivalent to
Uk(ℓk, µk) =
{(
µk −
1
Fk
)
ℓkCk +
RkCk
Fk
, 0 ≤ ℓk ≤ mk,
βkℓk + µkℓkCk, mk < ℓk ≤ Rk,
(4)
where βk =
1
rk
+ Ckfc,k +
αk
rB,k
and 0 < mk < Rk is defined as
mk =
CkRk
βkFk+Ck
.
The goal of each user k is to minimize its own cost by
choosing the optimal offloaded data size ℓk for given price µk
set by the edge cloud. Mathematically, this problem can be
expressed as (follower problem)
P2 : min
ℓk
Uk(ℓk, µk) s.t. 0 ≤ ℓk ≤ Rk.
It is worth noting that the payment term in Problem P1 and
Problem P2 can be cancelled each other from the net utility
perspective. Problem P1 and Problem P2 in the Stackelberg
game are coupled in a complicated way, i.e., the pricing
strategies of the edge cloud have an influence on the offloaded
data sizes of the users which also impact the edge cloud’s
revenue in turn.
III. OPTIMAL ALGORITHM
To analyze the considered Stackelberg game, each user k
independently decides its offloading strategy ℓ∗k by solving
Problem P2 with given price µ. Knowing each user’s of-
floading decision ℓ∗k(µk), the edge cloud sets its optimal price
µ
∗ by solving Problem P1. The above process is known as
the backward induction. In this paper, two optimal pricing
strategies are considered, which are termed as uniform pricing
and differentiated pricing [14]. In the following, we will
investigate the two pricing schemes respectively.
A. Uniform Pricing
For the uniform pricing scheme, the edge cloud sets and
broadcasts a uniform price to all users, i.e., µ = µ1 · · · =
µK . For given uniform price µ, the objective function Uk is a
piecewise function of ℓk, which is linear in each interval from
(4). Then, by exploiting the structure of Uk, we can obtain the
optimal solution for Problem P2 in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The optimal offloading decision of each user
in Problem P2 follows the threshold-based policy, i.e.,
ℓ∗k(µ) = mkxk, ∀k, (5)
3where the binary variable xk is defined as
xk =
{
1, µ ≤ 1Fk ,
0, otherwise.
(6)
Proof. Please refer to Appendix A.
From Proposition 1, we obtain that the offloading threshold
is 1/µ, i.e., user k prefers to offload mk bits to the edge
cloud if its CPU frequency Fk is smaller than or equal to the
threshold, and leaves all bits for local computing otherwise. In
other words, the computation offloading is beneficial if the user
has small computational speed Fk and it is likely to compute
locally otherwise.
Then we turn our attention to Problem P1. By substituting
(5) into Problem P1, the optimization problem at the edge
cloud for the uniform pricing scheme can be rewritten as
P3 : max
µ≥0
UB(µ) = µ
K∑
k=1
mkxkCk (7)
s.t.
K∑
k=1
mkxkCk ≤ F. (8)
Proposition 2. Without loss of generality, we sort 1/F1 <
· · · < 1/FK−1 < 1/FK , the optimal uniform price µ
∗ must
belong to the set {1/F1, · · · , 1/FK−1, 1/FK}.
Proof. Please refer to Appendix B.
According to Proposition 2, the revenue maximization prob-
lem in P3 reduces to the one-dimensional search problem over
K values in {1/Fk}
K
k=1 and we summarize the whole method
in Algorithm 1 formally. Specially, the edge cloud bargains
with the users by announcing price in the decreasing order of
{1/Fk}
K
k=1. Since the required sum CPU cycles
∑K
k=1 ℓkCk
decreases with the price µ, the price bargaining ends as long
as the computation capacity constraint (8) is active and there
is no need for bargaining the rest of price candidates.
It is obvious that the total complexity of Algorithm 1 to
search µ∗ is O(logK). For the uniform pricing scheme, the
edge cloud needs the limited network information, i.e., Fk and
Ck, which are collected by the cloud before the algorithm.
In each iteration, after knowing the price µ broadcasted by
the edge cloud, each user independently makes its offloading
decision ℓk and reports it to the edge cloud for updating the
price. Therefore, the cloud broadcasts the price µ and each user
reports its offloading decision ℓk, which are the information
exchanged between the edge cloud and the users in each
iteration. Hence, Algorithm 1 is a fully distributed algorithm.
B. Differentiated Pricing
Here, we consider the general case where the edge cloud
charges the different users with different prices. Similar to the
uniform pricing case, the optimal solution for Problem P2 is
also (5), except that µ in xk is replaced by µk. And, Problem
P1 can be rewritten as
P4 : max
µ0
UB(µ) =
K∑
k=1
µkmkxkCk s.t. (8).
Algorithm 1 Optimal Uniform Pricing Policy for Problem P3
1: The edge cloud initializes τ = K and µτ = 1/Fτ .
2: repeat
3: Every user decides its optimal offloaded data size
ℓ∗k(µ
τ ) according to (5).
4: The edge cloud computes its revenue UB(µ
τ ) from (7).
5: if
∑K
k=1 ℓ
∗
k(µ
τ )Ck ≤ F then
6: Update the price µτ−1 = 1/Fτ−1, and τ ← τ − 1;
7: else
8: Set UB(µ
τ ) = 0; beak;
9: end if
10: until τ ≤ 0.
11: Output µ∗ ← argmaxµτ UB(µ
τ ).
It is worth noting that the price µk is actually a function of
xk for user k. Specifically, xk = 1, i.e., µk ≤ 1/Fk and the
optimal price for user k is thus given by µ∗k = 1/Fk as the
objective function of Problem P4 is an increasing function of
µk. When xk = 0, the edge cloud sets the price for user k as
µ∗k = ∞ and earns no revenue. Based on the above analysis,
Problem P4 is thus equivalent to
P4′ : max
xk∈{0,1}
UB(xk) =
K∑
k=1
mkxkCk
Fk
s.t. (8).
Problem P4′ is actually a binary knapsack problem with the
weight mkCk and the value mkCk/Fk for user k. Since the
problem is NP-complete, there is no efficient algorithm solving
it optimally. However, we can apply dynamic programming
[15] to solve the above binary knapsack problem in pseudo-
polynomial time.1
Each user k needs to report mk, Ck, and Fk to the edge
cloud for solving Problem P4′ and there is no need for
iteration between the edge cloud and users. Obtaining the
optimal price µ∗k, user k decides its optimal strategy based
on (5). Therefore, the differentiated pricing scheme is also a
distributed algorithm, but it needs more information and higher
complexity than that of the uniform pricing scheme.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In the simulation setup, we assume that the total chan-
nel bandwidth B is 1 MHz and the noise power spectrum
density N0 is −174 dBm/Hz. Each hk is assumed to be
uniformly distributed in [−50,−30] dBm. The local CPU
frequency Fk for each user k is uniformly selected from the set
{0.1, 0.2, · · · , 1} GHz, and the required number of CPU cycles
per bit and the data size for user k are uniformly distributed
with Ck ∈ [500, 1500] cycles/bit and Rk ∈ [100, 500] KB,
respectively. Unless otherwise noted, the remaining parameters
are set as follows: pk = 0.1 W, PB,k = 1 W, F = 6 × 10
9
cycles/slot, αk = 0.2, and fC = 100 GHz.
The average performance of the two proposed pricing
schemes is evaluated and compared in terms of average latency
and revenue. Besides, we consider the scheme where all input
1 We adopt kp01(·) software package in MATLAB.
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Fig. 1: Performance comparison.
data is computed locally at users for comparison. In Fig. 1(a),
both latency and revenue performance become better as the
computation capacity increases, while the scheme of only local
computing has the worst latency performance and is not related
with the computation capacity. In addition, the differentiated
pricing scheme has better performance in both latency and
revenue, which shows that it is more accurate to allocate
resource. Thus there exists a tradeoff between performance
and complexity for the two pricing schemes.
Fig. 1(b) illustrates the effect of the number of users on
the average latency and revenue, and we have the similar
observations as Fig. 1(a) for the three schemes. Besides, with
the increasing number of users, the allocated spectrum for each
user decreases, resulting in lower transmission rate and thus
higher latency. Moreover, it is expected that competition with
more users forces up the prices and revenue of the edge cloud.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we investigated the price-based computation
offloading for a multiuser MEC system. The finite computation
capacity of the edge cloud was considered to manage the of-
floaded tasks from users. The Stackelberg game was applied to
model the interaction between the edge cloud and users. Based
on the edge cloud’s knowledge of the network information, we
proposed uniform and differentiated pricing schemes, which
can both be implemented with distributed manners.
APPENDIX A
THE PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
For given µ, the optimal solution for Problem P2 is
ℓ∗k(µ)

= mk, µ <
1
Fk
,
∈ [0,mk], µ =
1
Fk
,
= 0, otherwise.
(9)
The case µ = 1/Fk for all k occurs with probability 0 and we
let ℓk = mk in this case, which completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
THE PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
It can be proved by contradiction as follows. Suppose that
the optimal price µ∗ can exist in the interval (1/Fi, 1/Fi+1),
∀i ∈ {1, · · · ,K−1}. Then, we consider the case µ˜ = 1/Fi+1.
From (6), we can obtain that xk = 0 with k = 1, · · · , i and
xk = 1 with k = i+ 1, · · · ,K for both µ˜ and µ
∗. Therefore,
the CPU cycles of the sum offloaded data
∑K
k=1mkxkCk
for µ˜ are equivalent to that for µ∗. As the objective function
UB(µ) given in (7) is an increasing linear function of the price
µ, we can always have that the case µ˜ = 1/Fi+1 achieves
a higher revenue than the case µ∗. Thus, this contradicts
with the assumption that µ∗ is optimal for Problem P3 with
1/Fi < µ
∗ < 1/Fi+1. Therefore, the optimal price µ
∗ must
exist in the set {1/F1, ..., 1/FK−1, 1/FK}.
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